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NOTES
THE INHERENT POWERS OF CORPORATION PRESIDENTS
Certain legal commentators have considered it a fundamental
rule of agency that an agent has authority to do only those acts
which his principal has expressly, impliedly, or apparently per-
mitted him to perform., These writers have maintained that it
is an equally basic principle that a person who deals with one
who claims to be an agent must, in order to have an action
against the alleged principal, prove that the act done by the
person purporting to be the agent was within the limits of his
authority.2 Since the president of a corporation is the agent of
the corporation 3 it would be expected that the powers of the presi-
dent of a corporation would be subject to these rules of agency.
It is the purpose of this note to determine: first, whether the
president of a corporation actually has any more power than
that accorded him by virtue of the first of the aforementioned
rules; and second, whether it is necessary for a person, who is
suing a corporation for the acts of its president, to establish the
authority of the president.
I
Accompanying the development of Illinois as a business center
a considerable number of cases dealing with the instant problems
were decided in that state. Illinois has consequently had the
opportunity to develop this phase of the law to such a degree
that the doctrines it has established have been followed by many
of the states. It is therefore proper that we consider the Illinois
law as a basis for the ensuing discussion.
The first case in that state which dealt with the problem of the
authority of the president of a corporation was one in which the
plaintiff alleged the existence of a contract by which the de-
fendant carrier agreed to furnish a large quantity of iron to be
carried by the plaintiff at $6.00 per ton.4 The plaintiff sought
to introduce in evidence admissions made by the president of the
defendant railway company, wherein the president acknowledged
the existence of the contract and the authority of the agent who
made it. Although an admission is not a business transaction,
the court held that the corporation was bound by the acts of its
officers in the transaction of its ordinary business and allowed
the admissions in evidence, even though there had been no affir-
1. 1 Mechem, Treatise on the Law of Agency (2d ed. 1914).
2. Id. at sec. 473 et seq.
3. 2 Machen, A Treatise on Modern Law of Corporations (1908) sec. 1654.
4. C. B. & Q. Railway v. Coleman et al. (1857) 18 Ill. 297, 68 Am.
Dec. 544.
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mative authorization or subsequent ratification of the acts by the
defendant. The court did not explain what it meant by ordinary
business transacted through corporate officers. The power which
the court attributed to the president in this case has come to be
known as ex officio, incidental, or inherent power.0
Subsequent to this case the Supreme Court of Illinois, while
holding that the president of a corporation6 had the inherent
power to transfer personal property of the corporation consisting
of articles of trade, said that "* * * in absence of proof to the
contrary, it must be presumed the president had" such authority.7
Under this view it would be unnecessary, where what might be
regarded as a routine matter was concerned, to establish affirma-
tively the authority of the president in order to hold the de-
fendant liable.
This presumption of authority has at certain times been said
to refer to "acts" performed by the president, at other times to
"contracts." Typical of those cases which speak of "acts" was
one" in which a printing company recovered judgment against
an irrigation company upon a $35.00 debt incurred under a con-
tract made by its president pursuant to which the plaintiff was
to set type for the irrigation company's semi-annual publication.
Here again, the contract was so small as probably to be of a
routine nature. But a later case, Lloyd & Co. v. Mathews & Rice,
spoke of the presumption of authority in the president to make
"contracts" in the ordinary course of business and in further-
ance of the corporate interests. The court said that the president
is by virtue of his office, recognized as the business head
of the company, and any contract pertaining to the corporate
affairs, within the general powers of such officers ;10 executed
by the president on behalf of his corporation, will, in absence
of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have been done by
authority of the corporation.
5. The courts use the term "inherent" powers in these cases to mean all
those powers which the president would have in the absence of express,
implied, or apparent limitations upon that power. Whenever that term is
used in this note it will be used in that sense.
6. The court failed to mention the type of business transacted by this
corporation.
7. Moser v. Kreigh (1868) 49 Ill. 84, 86.
8. Coyzens & Beaton Typesetting Co. v. Western Ranch & Irrigation Co.
(1904) 112 Ill. App. 309; see also Bank of Minn. v. Griffin (1897) 168 Ill.
314, 48 N. E. 154, aff'g 66 Ill. App. 577.
9. (1906) 223 Ill. 477, 79 N. E. 172, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376, 114 Am.
St. Rep. 346, aff'g 119 Ill. App. 546.
10. The court was called upon, in this case, to determine what the powers
of the president are, but the court assumed the question by answering that
he could make any contract which was "within the general powers of such
officer."
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The court therefore held that the defendant corporation 1 was
liable to the plaintiff on a guaranty of a $1,500 promissory note
made by the defendant's president. Although the nature of the
business transacted by the defendant corporation did not appear
in this case, the making of guarantees of this nature is not usu-
ally considered routine, but may even be considered to be an
ultra vires transaction. An examination of the language in the
Lloyd case discloses that it does not require that the act be an
"ordinary" or "usual" transaction, but merely that it pertain to
the corporate affairs. While the ordinary meaning of the term
"contracts" is narrower than the meaning of the term "acts,"
the Illinois courts apparently have not intended, by using the
former term, to limit the application of the rule to contracts.
Rather it would seem that the terms have been used interchange-
ably. Thus in one case the term "contracts" was used although
the case involved the authority of the president to grant a waiver
without consideration. 1 2
Every case decided in Illinois before 1908, including the lead-
ing case of Lloyd & Co. v. Mathews & Rice, 3 could have been
decided upon one of the following bases: implied authority aris-
ing from a previous course of business, express or implied rati-
fication, estoppel, or unjust enrichment arising from the reten-
tion of benefits derived by the company from the transaction.'14
The rules laid down in these cases are therefore broader than
the facts of the cases require. However, in Jones & Dommersnas
Co. v. Crary"1 the only issue involved was the existence of an
inherent power in the president to act as he did. The appellant
corporation sought to have declared forfeited a license, giving
the appellee the right to manufacture and sell saws during the
lifetime of the patent held by the appellant. By the terms of the
licensing agreement the appellee was to pay quarterly a six per-
cent royalty upon the gross sum collected from the sale of the
saws. The forfeiture was demanded because the appellee had
failed to make required quarterly reports on the amount of the
11. It does not appear from the case what kind of business the defendant
corporation normally transacted.
12. Jones & Dommersnas Co. v. Crary (1908) 234 Ill. 26, 84 N. E. 651,
aff'g 138 Ill. App. 225.
13. (1908) 223 Ill. 477, 79 N. E. 172, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376, 114 Am.
St. Rep. 346, aff'g 119 Ill. App. 546.
14. According to St. Vincent College v. Hallett (C. C. A. 7, 1912) 201
Fed. 471, 476 every Illinois case before 1912 could have been decided on
other grounds. The Jones & Dommersnas case, however, could have been
decided on no other ground.
15. (1908) 234 Ill. 26, 84 N. E. 651, aff'g 138 Ill. App. 225.
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sales. The defense was that the president of the licensing cor-
poration had without consideration waived the right to require
the reports. To this defense the plaintiff answered that its presi-
dent had no authority to grant the waiver. The court held
The general rule is that a corporation acts through its
president, and through him executes its contracts and agree-
ments, and in the absence of proof to the contrary he will
be presumed to have authority to represent the corporation.
There is reason to believe that the president acted outside the
"ordinary" or "usual" course of the corporate business in Jones
& Dommersnas v. Crary;126 for such acts as waivers are not rou-
tine acts and therefore are not normally performed by corpora-
tion presidents. Nevertheless the corporation was held liable for
the president's acts. The court probably reached the conclusion
largely because it disliked creating a forfeiture. Although the
decision is unsatisfactory in that it gives no indication whether
such an act could be regarded as a transaction relating to the
ordinary business of the corporation, it does show that the courts
will not adhere slavishly to the requirement that the act per-
formed by the president be within the ordinary course of the
corporate business.
It is to be recalled that the previously mentioned cases involved
the authority of the president to make contracts. Jones & Dom-
mersnas v. Crary17 involved the authority of the president to
alter a valid contract. There was nothing in the language of that
case to indicate that the court recognized the distinction between
those cases in which the corporation denies the authority of the
president to make the contract and those cases in which the
corporation merely denies his authority to alter valid contracts.
This distinction should be recognized because a person who has
a valid contract with a corporation and who is merely attempting
to have that contract altered is more likely to rely upon the
authority of the president than is one who is trying to make a
contract with the company. The former may have a false sense
of security because of his previous dealings with the corporation.
This reasoning would also support the recognition of a distinc-
tion between those cases in which the party is entering into his
first negotiation with the corporation and those in which the
parties have had previous dealings.
In Weber et al. v. Aluminum Ore Co."" the Supreme Court of
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. (1922) 304 Ill. 273, 136 N. E. 685. The court cited only one section
of Corpus Juris as authority and failed to notice another section of that
work which set forth the recognized Illinois law.
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Illinois abandoned the point of view laid down in Jones & Dom-
mersnas v. Crary. The Weber case held that the president 9 of
a trust company to which land had been entrusted for sale did not
have the power to make and record a plat of -the land, declaring
that the president had no greater power by virtue of his office
than did any director, save that he presided at meetings of the
board of directors. According to the great weight of authority20
a member of the board of directors has no power to act by him-
self. Therefore, if the court in this case intended that the presi-
dent have only the power of a director, it must necessarily have
denied all inherent or ex officio power to the president. Later
Illinois cases have failed to follow or cite the Weber case. In
view of the fact that subsequent Illinois decisions hold that a
corporation president does not have the power to convey or
transfer interests in land because they are extraordinary trans-
actions, the result obtained in this case is not out of line.
Between 1926 and 1932 the dicta in the Illinois cases merely
required that the act of the president pertain to the corporate
affairs and be within the general powers and the by-laws 2" of
the corporation in order that the presumption of the president's
authority might be drawn. This doctrine would give the presi-
dent as much power as the board of directors. The results ob-
tained, however, could have been obtained under the previous
Illinois rulings, for in none of the cases decided during this
six-year period did the president exercise an extraordinary
power.22 The Illinois case subsequently reverted to the rule laid
down in Jones & Dommersnas v. Crary.23
It has been frequently stated in dicta in Illinois opinions that
the presumption of authority in the president is rebuttable. To
rebut this presumption it would seem that it would be necessary
to show that the president had been forbidden to perform the
19. The court failed to mention whether the president was a director or
not. In Illinois the president of a corporation is not required to be a mem-
ber of the board of directors, nor is he required to preside over the meetings
of the board, so one must wonder how the court determined that the presi-
dent had the power to preside at board meetings. Ill. Smith-Hurd Revised
Stat. (1935) ch. 32, sec. 157.43.
20. 2 Machen, Treatise on Law of Corporations (1908) sec. 1436.
21. Bloom v. Nathan Vehon Co. (1930) 341 Ill. 200, 173 N. E. 270.
22. Quigley v. W. N. Macqueen & Co. (1926) 321 Ill. 124, 151 N. E.
487; Peoria Life Ins. Co. v. Int. Life & Annuity Co. (1927) 246 Ill. App.
38; Bloom v. Nathan Vehon Co. (1930) 341 Ill. 200, 173 N. E. 270; Green
v. Ashland Sixty-third State Bank (1931) 346 Ill. 174, 178 N. E. 468, 471;
Corn Belt Bank of Bloomington, Ill. v. Forman (1932) 264 Ill. App. 589;
Beatty v. Fed. Fireproof Storage Co. (1932) 268 Ill. App. 198.
23. (1908) 234 Ill. 26, 84 N. E. 651, aff'g 138 Ill. App. 225.
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act which is the basis of the cause of action or that the presi-
dent's powers had been limited by a charter or statute provision,
a by-law, the president's contract of employment, a resolution
of the board of directors, or a special instruction of the board
of directors. A number of decisions, however, emphasize the fact
that the by-laws and resolutions of the board of directors "are
more or less private property of the corporation" 24 and are not
binding upon anyone other than members of the company.2 If
these decisions were to govern the courts, the result would be
that the courts' statements about the existence of a rebuttable
presumption of authority as to third persons would be mere
verbiage and erroneous, and instead of a rebuttable presumption
of authority as to third persons, there would be a conclusive
presumption.26 Presumably persons who knew of the limitations
on the president's power would be unable to rely upon the pre-
sumption, otherwise conclusive, because the basis for the pre-
sumption is the court's desire to protect the innocent and the
ignorant.
In other cases, however, in which the point was not expressly
involved, the court stated that, although the by-laws of a cor-
poration would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of authority
in the president,27 it could find no such limitations in the by-laws
of these particular defendants. Brown v. Fire Insurance Com-
pany of Chicago,28 which is the latest Illinois case on this prob-
lem, is typical of these cases. The defendant insurance corpora-
tion was held not bound by an unauthorized contract made by its
president, by which the company was required to purchase its
own stock from the plaintiff. Although the court recognized that
the power of the president had its limitations in the corporation's
"charter, by laws, etc." the court failed to find any evidence of a
declaration by the board of directors which would limit his
24. See Globe Indemnity Co. v. MeAvoy Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1930) 41 F.
(2d) 122 which applies the Illinois law.
25. Green v. Ashland Sixty-third State Bank (1931) 346 Ill. 174, 178
N. E. 468, 471; McRoberts v. Minier (1933) 270 Ill. App. 1, 14; Trawick
v. Peoria & Ft. C. St. Ry. Co. (1896) 68 Ill. App. 156; Munn v. Burch
(1860) 25 Ill. 35 (involving an officer other than the president) ; Smith v.
Smith (1872) 62 Ill. 493, 497 (involving a vice-president rather than a presi-
dent); Ward v. Johnson (1880) 95 Ill. 215, 248 (no president involved
here); McCormick et al. v. Unity Co. (1909) 239 Ill. 306, 87 N. E. 924,
aff'g 142 Ill. App. 159 (actually involving implied, and not inherent power);
Schorr v. Shayne & Co. (1917) 208 Ill. App. 328.
26. Illinois Business Corporation Act Annotated With Forms (1934) 175.
27. Bank of Minneapolis v. Griffin (1897) 168 Ill. 314, 48 N. E. 154;
Corn Belt Bank v. Forman (1932) 264 Ill. App. 589; and Brown v. Fire
Insurance Co. of Chicago (1934) 274 Ill. App. 414.
28. (1934) 274 Ill. App. 414.
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authority. Other limitations would probably include rules and
regulations made by the board of directors, statutes, and the
president's contract of employment.
Judging the Illinois situation by this case it would seem that
the presumption of authority is rebuttable. All that would be
necessary for a corporation to do to protect itself from unauthor-
ized acts of its president, therefore, would be to pass a by-law
forbidding him to exercise any or certain powers. The result
would be that a person who was suing the corporation for the
acts of its president would have to establish the authority of
the president, just as he would have to do under the ordinary
rules of agency.
Although there are many Illinois cases on the inherent power
of corporation presidents it is impossible to discern any trends
towards liberalization or constriction in the application of the
Illinois rule. Despite the shifting statements of the rule it does
not seem that there has been any difference in results. Perhaps
this is because the problems presented in the various cases could
have been disposed of in the same manner under each variation
of the rule. The language in all the cases, except those which
were decided between 1926 and 1932,29 recognized that the re-
buttable presumption of authority in the president extended only
to those transactions which are in the ordinary course of the
corporate business. 30 But we have seen that the court will not
always require that the president's act be within the ordinary
course of the corporate business.3 1
Thus it is evident that the terms "ordinary" or "usual course
of the corporate business" do not fully express that which the
Illinois courts intend. Despite the fact that the president of a
corporation is usually allowed to execute or indorse notes, 2 such
a transaction might not be an "ordinary" or "usual" action for
it might be the first time the corporation ever executed or in-
29. Supra, notes 21 and 22.
30. Thus it has been held that the president of a corporation may execute
notes, Wells v. Mfrs. & Merch. Life Assoc. (1919) 213 Ill. App. 549; in-
dorse notes, Corn Belt Bank v. Forman (1932) 264 Ill. App. 589; confess
a judgment or issue a warrant of attorney, State Bank of East Moline
v. Moline Pressed Steel Co. (1918) 283 Ill. 581, 119 N E. 604; contra,
Boston Tailoring House v. Fisher (1895) 59 Ill. App. 400; sell product
made by the corporation, Beatty v. Fed. Fireproof Storage Co. (1932) 268
Ill. App. 198; hire necessary help, Schorr v. Shayne & Co. (1917) 208
Ill. App. 328; sell the corporation's stock, Quigley v. Macqueen & Co. (1926)
321 Ill. 124, 151 N. E. 487; or may offer a reward for the arrest of a
defaulting teller, Bank of Minneapolis v. Griffin (1897) 168 Ill. 314, 48
N. E. 154.
31. Supra, note 15.
32. Supra, note 30.
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dorsed a note. The courts, however, have given meaning to these
terms by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
It has been held, for example, that there is no presumption of
authority in the president to make an assignment for the benefit
of creditors,33 execute a mortgage,34 purchase the company's own
stock for the corporation,35-hire an employee for an unreasonable
length of time,3" or promise to pay another officer a salary3 7 be-
cause each of these transactions were not within the "usual" or
"ordinary" course of business. The rebuttable presumption of
authority in Illinois must extend, therefore, to routine acts in
the course of the corporate business. It does not extend to acts
which would subject the company to heavy burdens or to a great
outlay of money; nor to acts which would bind it for an un-
reasonable length of time or have the tendency to wind up the
corporation. As we have seen in Jones & Dommersnas v. Crary3"
the courts will not slavishly require that the act fall within the
aforementioned class of cases.
II
The Missouri courts have wavered between the liberal Illinois
rule and the strict rules of agency. The courts in this state
originally followed the Illinois rule and held that there was a
rebuttable presumption of authority in the president to represent
the corporation in the usual course of business. 9 The consider-
ations applicable to the previously discussed Illinois cases are
equally applicable to those Missouri cases which adopted the
Illinois rule. But in Truskett v. Commission Co.4° the Missouri
courts extended the Illinois rule. In that case there was an oral
one-year contract of employment under which plaintiff had
worked five months for the defendant corporation. The plain-
tiff tried to take the contract out of the operation of the Statute
of Frauds by introducing in evidence a letter of recommendation
written by the president of the defendant corporation two months
after the oral contract was made. In holding the defendant liable
the court said that, "A corporation can speak and act with refer-
33. Friedman v. Lesher (1902) 198 Ill. 21, 64 N. E. 736, 92 Am. St. Rep.
255.
34. State Nat. Bk. v. Moran (1896) 68 Ill. App. 25, aff'd 168 Ill. 519,
48 N. E. 82.
35. Brown v. Fire Ins. Co. of Chicago (1934) 274 Ill. App. 414.
36. Washburn v. Hoxide Institute (1927) 249 Ill. App. 194 where the
contract of employment was for ten years at a salary of $12,000 a year.
37. Bloom v. Nathan Vehon Co. (1930) 341 Ill. 200, 173 N. E. 270 where
the salary to be paid to the officer was $15,000 a year.
38. (1908) 234 Ill. 26, 84 N. E. 651, aff'g 138 Ill. App. 225.
39. Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 540, 15 S. W.
417, 12 L. R. A. 714, 24 Am. St. Rep. 351.
40. (Mo. App. 1915) 180 S. W. 1048.
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ence to its business affairs only through its authorized agents
and officers, and when it does so speak or act * * * it is bound as
natural persons are bound, by what they do or say." The court
did not seem to realize that even though the corporation might
necessarily have to speak through its agents it need not speak
through every agent, and especially through its president. The
court seemed to go beyond the limits of the Illinois rule by ex-
tending to the president those powers which are ordinarily ex-
tended only to a general manager.41 Until 1926 the results ob-
tained under the Missouri rulings were essentially the same as
those reached in Illinois. Subsequently the Missouri courts re-
turned to the strict rules of agency.4 2 The court held that where
a president of an equipment company42' had signed a promissory
note for $1000 in the name of the corporation it was necessary
that the plaintiff payee show that the president was clothed with
authority to borrow money and execute notes for the defendant
corporation.
III
In Kansas the courts have followed the Illinois rule and have
held that there is a rebuttable presumption of authority in the
president to perform those acts which are within the usual course
of the corporate business.43 But the Kansas courts, unlike those
of Illinois, have held that the president of a non-banking cor-
poration cannot indorse or guarantee promissory notes on the
ground that such transactions are not within the ordinary course
of business.4
IV
In Arkansas and Oklahoma the courts, unlike the Illinois
courts, hold that the president has no more power than any other
director.45 By statute in these states the president must be a
director.46 But a director acting by himself has no power.47
Arkansas has adopted this view on the basis of the agency re-
41. Grange, Corporation Law for Officers and Directors (1935) 463.
42. First Natl Bk. of Elyria v. Equipment Co. (1926) 221 Mo. App.
733, 285 S. W. 779.
42a. This company probably dealt in automobile equipment.
43. Sentney v. Central Cattle Loan Co. (1925) 119 Kan. 545, 240 Pac.
856.
44. Ibid.
45. Dent v. People's Bank of Imboden (1915) 118 Ark. 157, 175 S. W.
1154, 1 A. L. R. 688; City Electric Street Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Exch. Bk.
(1896) 62 Ark. 33, 34 S. W. 89, 31 L. R. A. 535, 54 Am. St. Rep. 282; and
Oklahoma City Gen. Hospital v. Weathers (Okl. 1930) 294 Pac. 98.
46. Crawford & Moses Stats. (1927 Supp.) see. 1700wl; Okl. Stats.
(1931) ch. 46, art. 4, sec. 9762.
47. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Harris Lumber Co. (1912) 103 Ark.
283, 146 S. W. 508, Ann. Cas. 1914B 713; and Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co. v.
Barber Asphalt Pay. Co. (1912) 34 Old. 149, 125 Pac. 734.
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quirement that one dealing with an agent is bound to ascertain
the nature and extent of his authority and must not trust to the
mere presumption of authority, nor to any mere assumption
thereof by the agent.48 There are dicta, however, in the decisions
of each state, that it is within the inherent power of a bank
president to conduct its pressing litigation.49
V
The cases which uphold the strict rules of agency proceed on
the theory that the third person who deals with an agent is in a
better position to protect himself than is the principal. It is
felt that because the third person deals of his own volition with
the agent, he cannot complain that he was deceived as to the
authority of the agent in the absence of an investigation of the
agent's authority. This theory has been considered equally ap-
plicable to corporation presidents. From a practical point of
view, however, it would appear that third persons who deal with
corporation presidents are not in a better position to protect
themselves than are the corporations. There would seem to be
a widespread popular understanding, perhaps even among law-
yers, that-the president of a corporation has broad power in the
absence of notice to the contrary. The very term "president"
suggests broad power. In many corporations the president is
also the general manager and it is unlikely that the public is
aware of the distinction in powers between the two officers. Most
people would be surprised to know that in Arkansas and Okla-
homa the president has no ex officio power. We have seen that
in those cases in which the third party already has a valid con-
tract with the corporation or has had previous dealings with the
company he is often lulled into a false sense of security. It is
because of these misconceptions of the public that some courts
have sought to alleviate what was thought to be a harsh result
of the ordinary rules of agency.
In Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas the courts have not protected
the public from its misconceptions to any great extent. It is still
possible for a corporation to defeat the rights of third persons
by passing a by-law prohibiting its president from exercising
any or certain rights. It results from the above that third per-
sons, who sue the corporation for the acts of its president, must
establish the authority of the president, as they would have to do
under the ordinary rules of agency. WILLARD B. MYERs.
48. City Electric Street Ry. Co. v. First Nat. Exch. Bk. (1896) 62 Ark.
33, 34 S. W. 89, 31 L. R. A. 535, 54 Am. St. Rep. 282.
49. National Bank v. Earl (1895) 2 Old. 617, 39 Pac. 391; Dent V.
People's Bk. of Imboden (1915) 118 Ark. 157, 175 S. W. 1154, 1 A. L. R.
688.
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